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Abstract 
The questions posed to the Court of Justice of the EU in the recent case of Walbusch Walter 
Busch asked what qualifies as the means of communication with a limited space or time to 
display the information and how detailed the disclosure on the right of withdrawal needs to 
be on such a medium. The judgment in this case had to strike a balance between not limiting 
traders’ opportunities to use technological advances to reach consumers and one of the main 
objectives of consumer protection: ensuring consumers have a chance to make fully informed 
transactional decisions. 
Keywords 
Consumer Rights Directive, right of withdrawal, pre-contractual information, active 
consumers, medium of limited communication 
1. Introduction 
Articles 6 and 8 of the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)1 oblige traders selling their goods 
at a distance to transparently provide specific information to consumers, before consumers 
are bound by a contract or a trader’s offer. The justification for introducing these information 
obligations lies in the assumed information asymmetry and, more generally, the imbalance of 
power between consumers and traders.2 One of the most important pieces of information that 
consumers should receive pertains to their right of withdrawal. This right aims to 
counterbalance the disadvantage that consumers suffer in distance selling contracts, of not 
being able to see and evaluate the offered goods.3 Without information about their right of 
withdrawal, consumers may not know they can terminate the transaction without having to 
give any reason for it, or that they only have a limited period to do so. Therefore, Article 
6(1)(h) CRD obliges traders to inform consumers as to whether they have a possibility to use 
their right of withdrawal in a given transaction, its conditions, time limits and how they could 
exercise that right. Moreover, although consumers may choose how they want to withdraw 
from a contract, the same provision obliges traders to issue a model withdrawal form, which 
has been standardized in the Annex I(B) to the CRD. The European legislator deemed the 
standardized model withdrawal form to guarantee transparency, legal certainty and facilitate a 
possibility of the consumer’s withdrawal.4 
Still, the European legislator remains aware that nowadays an increased number of 
consumers conclude transactions at a distance through technologies limiting a possibility of 
making full disclosures of all contractual terms. For example, when consumers shop online 
on a smartphone, the phone’s display may hinder scrolling through the pages of pre-
contractual terms and conditions.5 Therefore, Article 8(4) CRD releases traders from their 
obligation to provide all mandatory pre-contractual information to consumers through the 
means of communication with a limited time or space to display this information, when such 
a medium is used to conclude the transaction. Instead, traders may use alternative ways of 
pre-contractual disclosure to either deliver the remaining mandatory information or to make it 
available to consumers. However, considering the importance of the right of withdrawal for 
consumer protection, regardless of the medium used to conclude the contract, traders need to 
provide consumers with information about this right. 
The questions posed to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the recent case of 
Walbusch Walter Busch6 asked what qualifies as the means of communication with a limited 
space or time to display the information and how detailed the disclosure on the right of 
withdrawal needs to be on such a medium. The judgment in this case had to strike a balance 
between not limiting traders’ opportunities to use technological advances to reach consumers 
and one of the main objectives of consumer protection: ensuring that consumers have a 
chance to make fully informed transactional decisions.7 
2. Facts 
A German clothing company, Walbusch Walter Busch, conducted its business by offering 
consumers a mail order option. Consumers received multiple pages of advertising leaflets, 
tucked in newspapers or magazines, containing information about Walbusch Walter Busch’s 
products. If a particular product appealed to consumers, they could detach a part of the leaflet 
and use it as a mail order coupon. Sending a mail order coupon led to the conclusion of a 
distance selling contract with Walbusch Walter Busch. The mail order coupon provided 
information to consumers about Walbusch Walter Busch, including its website address and 
mentioned, but did not specify, the existence of the consumers’ right of withdrawal. Further 
information on the right of withdrawal and the model withdrawal form could be found on the 
trader’s website, under the tab ‘AGB’, which is an abbreviation for the German Allgemeine 
Geschäftsbedingungen (general conditions of sale).8 A German association fighting against 
unfair commercial practices, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am 
Main, considered the lack of provision of the model withdrawal form to consumers together 
with the leaflet infringed formal information requirements placed on traders by the CRD.9 
3. Judgment 
It is possible to distinguish two separate elements in the judgment, regarding the scope of the 
notion of the means of communication with a limited time or space for the display of the 
information and regarding the provision of the information on the right of withdrawal itself. 
These two issues will now be discussed in turn. 
A. Means of communication with a limited time or space to display the information 
To assess whether in a given case Walbusch Walter Busch properly fulfilled its disclosure 
obligations, the national court had to consider whether this trader could benefit from an 
exemption, as provided in Article 8(4) CRD. The exemption allows traders to provide only 
essential pre-contractual information through the means of communication used to conclude a 
contract, while disclosing all other pre-contractual information through another medium of 
communication. As this exemption is only available if the means of communication used by 
the trader limits the time or space for a display of the information, it was necessary for the 
CJEU to guide the national court in ascertaining the scope of that notion. 
The CJEU recognized that, due to technical constraints, certain media are unsuitable 
for providing full pre-contractual disclosures to consumers.10 Examples of such media 
include smartphones, as their screens allow the display of a limited number of characters, and 
a television sales spot, which limits the amount of information that could be effectively 
conveyed to consumers due to its short duration.11 It needs to be highlighted that the CJEU 
does not require traders to bear a higher cost for using a particular medium of 
communication, only to ensure that consumers receive all information. We could stipulate 
here that a trader could provide all required information in a television sales spot, but this 
would likely prolong its screening time, which is costly. Here the Court balances the need to 
protect consumers with the need to facilitate trade in the internal market and recognizes it is 
not only the inherent character of the medium used, but also the trader’s economic choice that 
may limit the time or space for a display of the mandatory information.12 
When a national court assesses the character of a given medium of communication, 
trying to establish its limited character, it needs to account for all technical features that 
facilitate communication. Moreover, the evaluation of whether all pre-contractual 
information could be communicated effectively through that medium needs to be objective.13 
Therefore, it should not matter what choices a given trader has made, for example, when 
choosing a particular type or size of font for communicating the information to consumers, 
but rather what was reasonably feasible. The feasibility assessment could be an estimate, for 
example, the smallest font that an average targeted consumer could read.14 Consequently, a 
trader may not defend their lack of disclosure with an argument of a limited space of the 
chosen medium of communication, if this trader chose to use a particularly large font that 
allowed them only to convey a few words to consumers. 
It is worth mentioning separately that the CJEU uses the benchmark of not just an 
average consumer, that is a reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect 
consumer,15 but an average consumer of a targeted group. This will allow national courts to 
pay attention to the vulnerabilities of consumers who have been targeted by a given 
communication. As an example, national courts in the Walbusch Walter Busch case could 
consider the chosen medium of communication, that is advertising leaflets, often target 
elderly consumers, who might require the use of a bigger size of font to make the 
communication accessible.16 
B. Information on the right of withdrawal 
When traders use a medium of communication with a limited time or space for a display of 
the information, Article 8(4) CRD allows them to provide all non-essential mandatory 
information to consumers through other communication sources. However, the 
communication still needs to occur in the pre-contractual phase of the transaction. Whilst 
providing an exemption, this provision lists the information on the right of withdrawal as part 
of the essential pre-contractual mandatory information. Consequently, consumers need to 
receive such information through the same means of communication that are used to 
conclude the transaction.17 
According to the CJEU, however, the above-mentioned obligation does not go as far 
as obliging traders to deliver a model withdrawal form to consumers through such limited 
means of communication.18 The Court justifies this reasoning in two ways. First, if a trader 
informs consumers of the existence, or the lack thereof, of the right of withdrawal through the 
means of communication with a limited time or space for a display of the information, then 
consumers already know about their right of withdrawal. The attachment of a model 
withdrawal form would not provide them with any additional information, which could be 
relevant at the stage of deciding whether to conclude a given contract. Second, if traders were 
always obliged to deliver the model withdrawal form through the medium of communication 
also used to conclude a transaction, it could significantly limit their marketing capabilities. 
For example, it would no longer be possible to conclude contracts on a phone.19 
This does not release traders from an obligation to provide a model withdrawal form 
to consumers in the pre-contractual phase of a transaction. This model withdrawal form, 
together with all other non-essential information, should be given to consumers through 
another source of communication and in a transparent manner.20 As an example of other 
means of pre-contractual communication that traders could use, the CJEU lists a toll-free 
phone number or a hyperlink to the trader’s website.21 The important element of the 
compliance test is whether a consumer could access the remaining mandatory disclosures 
easily and directly. 
4. Will the imaginary active consumers please stand up? 
Although consumer transactions tend to expose the information asymmetry between the 
parties concluding them, the risk increases with distance-selling contracts. When consumers 
have no opportunity to physically examine the goods or ask questions about their 
characteristics directly to traders, they are also less likely to make informed transactional 
decisions.22 This may explain the abundance of mandatory information obligations in 
distance-selling contracts and their status as one of the key measures of consumer protection 
through which the European legislator hopes to reach consumers and restore the contractual 
balance.23 
However, based on the evidence gathered in empirically conducted research, many 
scholars have claimed that consumers do not pay attention to pre-contractual disclosures and, 
even if they do, they are likely unable to understand such disclosures.24 Disappointingly, the 
CJEU’s judgment does not seem to take into consideration these findings that consumers are 
hard-pressed to devote their resources to finding and deciphering the pre-contractual 
information . If consumer protection measures aim at providing consumers with the 
mandatory, pre-contractual information in a model withdrawal form, then traders should be 
obliged to do more than just make such information available to consumers.25 After all, 
behavioural studies show we cannot count on consumers to actively access such information, 
as traders actually struggle to attract consumers’ attention despite their use of various 
marketing strategies.26 This is, however, the solution the CJEU supports when suggesting a 
trader could limit itself to providing a toll-free phone number or a hyperlink to a website with 
terms and conditions. Essentially, either option would require consumers to act to obtain this 
information, which remains unlikely. Moreover, the CJEU did not consider, or advise the 
national court to check, whether consumers of Walbusch Walter Busch, who were concluding 
their contracts through a mail order form, could access the Internet to visit the trader’s 
website. 
In this respect, it is worth noting the difference between the previously binding 
Distance Selling Directive27 and the CRD.28 The previously binding rules were interpreted by 
the CJEU as requiring traders to actively provide the pre-contractual information to 
consumers.29 The European legislator introduced a different language to the CRD, however, 
which now the CJEU seems to have interpreted as allowing traders to count on the consumers 
being active in this regard. 
Of course, we need to remember that consumers’ interests are not the only ones that 
EU consumer law serves, as ultimately it intends to contribute to the good functioning of the 
internal market.30 However, the above-described reasoning of the CJEU is not the only way 
to guarantee the balance between the divergent needs of consumers and traders. Namely, 
although the CRD allows traders to use alternative media to communicate with consumers, 
this opportunity could be linked to an obligation to push some information in the consumers’ 
direction. In practice, a trader could be obliged to call a consumer and orally explain the 
model withdrawal form, instead of just providing a toll-free phone number. Alternatively, a 
trader could send an email to consumers with a model withdrawal form, instead of expecting 
them to find it on its website. Both these solutions are technologically feasible, as a trader 
would have access to the consumer’s contact data and this is likely less costly than extending 
the use of a communication source with limited space or time to display all the pre-
contractual information. More importantly, the CJEU could have used provisions of the CRD 
to place such obligations on traders, by interpreting the traders’ obligation to ‘give’ 
information to consumers from Article 6 CRD as not requiring any activity on the side of 
consumers in accessing this information. Simultaneously, the CJEU could have highlighted 
that the other part of this provision referring to ‘making information available’ to consumers 
should be interpreted as not placing an obligation on traders to ensure consumers read such 
disclosures. 
What the CJEU could not address, but is nevertheless worth further elaboration, is 
whether we need model withdrawal forms at all. The CJEU could not question their purpose, 
as the CRD envisages their provision to consumers. As it has been mentioned above, Recital 
44 CRD explains that a standardized model withdrawal form aims to eliminate differences in 
the exercise of the withdrawal right by consumers in various Member States. This solution 
aims to reduce traders’ costs arising from having to comply with various information 
requirements in different Member States. Therefore, the purpose of introducing this specific 
information obligation is not related to consumer protection. This is self-explanatory if we 
consider that consumers may withdraw from a contract in any form and not just by using a 
model withdrawal form. The use of such a form might take longer, as there would be specific 
text to read and complete, compared with simply calling or emailing the trader. Previous 
research showed that information provided in a text box or a table could insufficiently inform 
consumers or be confusing.31 Considering traders still need to allow consumers to withdraw 
from a contract in any form and the model withdrawal form is at best just a guideline for 
consumers, we may wonder how beneficial these model withdrawal forms are for traders 
themselves,32 particularly if they lead to additional problems in providing consumers with the 
mandatory information, by extending its length. This case might be a good indication for the 
European legislator to either re-think the optional character of model withdrawal forms for 
exercising the right of withdrawal or their existence altogether. The first option would be 
detrimental to consumers, as prescribing the mandatory use of the model withdrawal form 
would place additional formal limitations on exercising the right of withdrawal. The second 
option, that is disposing of model withdrawal forms, does not seem to make much of a 
difference for traders’, if the Member States continue to be prevented from adopting their 
own national model withdrawal forms by the full harmonization character of the CRD. 
To conclude, in this judgment the CJEU follows the path set by the European 
legislator, but it is not paved with perfect solutions, neither to ensure the protection of 
consumer rights nor to strengthen the traders’ market position. Especially disappointing is 
that the CJEU seems to expect imaginary active consumers to stand up for themselves by 
actively accessing the pre-contractual information. 
Declaration of conflicting interests 
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article. 
Funding 
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of 
this article.  
ORCID iD 
Joasia Luzak https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3524-7340 
Notes 
1 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
on consumer rights [2011] OJ L 304/64 (‘Consumer Rights Directive’). 
2 See e.g. N. Helberger, ‘Forms matter: Informing consumers effectively’ BEUC (2013), 
https://www.beuc.eu/publications/x2013_089_upa_form_matters_september_2013.pdf; O. 
Seizov et al., ‘The Transparent Trap: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on the Design of 
Transparent Online Disclosures in the EU’, 42 Journal of Consumer Policy (2019) , p. 151-
152. 
3 See e.g. J. Luzak, ‘To Withdraw or Not To Withdraw? Evaluation of the Mandatory Right 
of Withdrawal in Consumer Distance Selling Contracts Taking Into Account Its Behavioural 
Effects on Consumers’, 37 Journal of Consumer Policy (2014), p. 91-92. 
4 See Recital 44 Consumer Rights Directive. 
5 DG Justice European Commission, ‘Guidance Document concerning Directive 
2011/83/EU’, European Commission (2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/crd_guidance_en_0.pdf, p. 33. 
6 Case C-430/17 Walbusch Walter Busch EU:C:2019:47. 
7 Ibid., para. 41. 
8 Ibid., para. 18. 
9 Ibid., para. 19. 
10 Ibid., para. 37. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., para. 38. 
13 Ibid., para. 39. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See e.g. Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide EU:C:1998:369, para. 31. 
16 See also A. Jabłonowska, ‘Disclosure duties versus freedom to conduct a business: CJEU 
partially departs from AG’s opinion in C-430/17 Walbusch Walter Busch’, Recent 
Developments in European Consumer Law (2019), http://recent-
ecl.blogspot.com/2019/01/disclosure-duties-versus-freedom-to.html. 
17 Case C-430/17 Walbusch Walter Busch, para. 44. 
18 Ibid., para. 46. 
19 Ibid. The Guidance on the CRD issued by the European Commission explains that when a 
contract is concluded on the phone, traders should explain the content of the model 
withdrawal form to consumers orally instead, see: DG Justice European Commission, p. 34. 
20 Case C-430/17 Walbusch Walter Busch, para. 46. 
21 Ibid., para. 37. 
22 See e.g. J. Luzak, 37 Journal of Consumer Policy (2014). 
23 See e.g. N. Helberger, 42 Journal of Consumer Policy (2019). 
24 See e.g. O. Ben-Shahar and C.E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure 
of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton University Press, 2014); I. Ayres and A. Schwartz, ‘The 
No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract law’, 66 Stanford Law Review (2014), p. 545-
610; Y. Bakos et al., ‘Does anyone read the fine print? Consumer attention to standard-form 
contracts’, 43 Journal of Legal Studies (2014), p. 1-35; E. Seira et al., ‘Are Information 
Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market’, 9 American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy (2017), p. 277-307; O. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 280. 
25 See e.g. J. Luzak, ‘Online Disclosure Rules of the Consumer Rights Directive: Protecting 
Passive or Active Consumers?’, 3 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (2015), p. 
79. 
26 G.R. Milne and M.J. Culnan, ‘Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why 
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices’, 18 Journal of Interactive 
Marketing (2004), p. 17, 19, 25; S. Harridge-March, ‘Can the Building of Trust Overcome 
Consumer Perceived Risk Online?’, 24 Marketing Intelligence & Planning (2006), p. 754-
755; J. Wirtz et al., ‘Causes and Consequences of Consumer Online Privacy Concern’, 18 
International Journal of Service Industry Management (2007), p. 341. 
27 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts [1997] OJ L 144/19 (‘Distance 
Selling Directive’), repealed by the new provisions of the CRD. 
28 See for the comparison of DSD and CRD provisions: J. Luzak, 3 Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law (2015), p. 82-85. The DSD required consumers to ‘be given’ or 
‘be provided with’ information, whilst the CRD specifies traders’ obligation to ‘give’ or 
‘make available’ this information. 
29 Case C-49/11 Content Services EU:C:2012:419, para. 32-35. 
30 Recital 5 CRD. 
31 The Gallup Organisation, ‘Testing of a Standardised Information Notice for Consumers on 
the Common European Sales Law’, The Gallup Organisation (2013), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/standardised-notice-common-european-sales-law_en. 
32 The introduction of the model withdrawal form has so far been uncritically accepted as 
beneficial for consumers, see e.g. C. Cauffman, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive – Adopted’, 
19 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2012), p. 215; S. Weatherill, ‘The 
Consumer Rights Directive: How and Why a Quest for “Coherence” Has (Largely) Failed’, 
49 Common Market Law Review (2012), p. 1296. 
